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Vector-borne diseases (VBDs) are some
of the world’s most common and devas-
tating maladies. Despite this truth, the
United States government had decided
to drastically cut funding for the Divi-
sion of Vector-Borne Infectious Diseases
(DVBID) program of the Centers for
Disease Control and Prevention (CDC)
in the Fiscal Year 2011 Labor, Health
and Human Services and Education
appropriations bill [1]. Nearly US$27
million had been removed from the
DVBID financial plan in the President’s
FY 2011 budget, slashing DVBID fund-
ing from US$39 million to US$12 million.
Although the program is minimally sup-
ported by other agencies, this 70%
funding cut would have virtually elimi-
nated the DVBID program.
Many organizations, including the
American Society of Tropical Medicine
and Hygiene, the Infectious Disease Soci-
ety of America, the American Society for
Microbiology, the American Red Cross,
and others, appealed to restore funding for
the DVBID program. At the end of July,
the Senate restored this funding complete-
ly at US$26.7 million in their version of
the FY 2011 appropriations bill, and
currently we are waiting for the House to
reveal its version. It is our hope that after
reconciling the two bills, DVBID program
funding will be completely restored.
VBDs are easily targeted for cutbacks in
public health funding because their inci-
dence, prevalence, morbidity, and associ-
ated mortality are routinely underestimat-
ed. Their impact is not adequately
captured by current disease burden assess-
ments, and therefore VBDs are often not
included in top-level discussions of disease-
control priorities [2–5]. We feel strongly
that funding cuts are short-sighted and
that continued surveillance and control
are worth the investment. In the absence
of a proactive surveillance system that
provides valid national and regional data
on VBD transmission, outbreak epidemi-
ology would likely be done by ‘‘official
denial’’, and subsequent public health
responses would likely be poorly managed
and of limited effectiveness [6,7].
Burden of Vector-Borne
Diseases
VBDs of major public health impor-
tance include a wide variety of bacterial,
parasitic, and viral infections that are
spread by blood-feeding arthropods. In
North America, prominent examples of
VBDs include West Nile virus (WNV),
Lyme disease, and dengue virus (Table 1).
In the United States, the most common
tick-borne infection is Lyme disease, which
results in extensive health care costs and
productivity losses. In 2008 alone, there
were 35,198 cases of Lyme disease report-
ed in the US.
Similarly, arthropod-borne viral infec-
tions, or arboviral infections, are common
causes of disabling fever syndromes world-
wide. These often progress to complica-
tions such as encephalitis or hemorrhagic
fever, which result in severe long-term
physical and cognitive impairment, or in
early death [8,9]. Between 2002 and 2008,
28,812 cases of West Nile disease were
reported in the US. The majority of these
(21,277) were neuroinvasive disease, a
statistic that reflects the serious underre-
porting of mild cases of WNV–associated
disease. Several other menacing arbovi-
ruses are considered to be ‘‘emerging
pathogens’’, based on their recent geo-
graphic spread and their increasing im-
pact on susceptible human populations
[10–19]. As an example, dengue virus
infections, once rare, are now estimated to
cause .50 million clinical cases per year
following a resurgence in Asia and the
virus’s respread through Central and
South America [20]. The US is now
threatened by the potential emergence of
public health threats such as Rift Valley
fever and chikungunya virus, which could
easily establish themselves within our
ecosystems. The recent emergence of
dengue in Texas (2005) and Florida
(2009–2010) demonstrates our continuing
vulnerability to such arboviral pathogens
[21].
Multi-Faceted Roles of the
DVBID
The Vector-Borne Infectious Diseases
program supports work on agents such as
WNV, plague, tularemia, yellow fever,
Lyme disease, dengue fever, Japanese
encephalitis, and othera r b o v i r a le n c e p h -
alitides. Themissionof the divisionis to1)
develop and maintain effective surveil-
lance for vector-borne viral and bacterial
agents and their arthropod vectors; 2)
conduct field and laboratory research and
epidemic aid investigations; 3) define
disease etiology, ecology, and pathogen-
esis in order to develop improved meth-
ods and strategies for disease diagnosis,
surveillance, prevention, and control; 4)
provide diagnostic reference and epide-
miologic consultation, on request, to state
and local health departments, other
components of the CDC, other federal
agencies, and national and international
health organizations; and 5) provide
intramural and extramural technical ex-
pertise and assistance in professional
training activities [22]. In addition, the
program maintains vital expertise for
other vector-borne infectious diseases
that occur only sporadically or in periodic
epidemics. The DVBID program inte-
grates local, state, and national labs to
create and maintain national and region-
al data that lead to quick identification of
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Not only does DVBID provide state,
national, and international support for
surveillance of threatening VBDs, it also
creates opportunities for training, cutting
edge research, and new control method-
ologies. The program currently allocates
about half of its budget to state epidemi-
ology programs to track and control
VBDs. The surveillance that DVBID
supports in local and state health depart-
ments allows for the estimation of preva-
lence and incidence data that funnels to
other crucial programs, such as safety
testing of our blood supply. In addition
to tracking diseases that are currently
circulating, the DVBID program also
provides the infrastructure and expertise
to identify emerging or new pathogens. As
such, it is part of our first line of defense
against the accidental or intentional intro-
duction of biodefense pathogens such as
plague, tularemia, typhus, dengue, and
many other viral hemorrhagic fevers and
encephalitides.
Consequences of Neglected
Surveillance
Put simply, proper surveillance prevents
illness in humans and animals. Elimination
of funding for the DVBID program would
jeopardize our nation’s security and wel-
fare. Funding cuts would dismantle the
current system and erase the effects of the
US$200 million and human capital that
has already been invested in the DVBID
program. The CDC estimates this cut
could lead to job losses for 100 state and
24 CDC employees and devastate the
CDC’s Dengue Branch in San Juan,
Puerto Rico, which also acts as a World
Health Organization (WHO) reference
center. Not only would jobs be lost, but
strategic partnerships between local, state,
and federal partners would also dwindle.
Once expertise and technical resources are
lost, they cannot be quickly recovered [6].
Neither can existing ‘‘tacit knowledge’’ be
quickly regained on how to provide
effective vector control. The National
Institutes of Health does not routinely
support research in surveillance; therefore,
without CDC’s activities in this vital task,
it would go undone. As a result, the
American public would become more
vulnerable to some of the most threatening
emerging and reemerging diseases of our
time.
The proposed cut in this program
would also lead to significant delays in
outbreak response and the identification of
new pathogens. This, in turn, would result
in unnecessary costs and patient harm
when VBD outbreaks occur. In this issue
of PLoS Neglected Tropical Diseases, Vazquez-
Prokopec and colleagues show us that the
costs of surveillance are far lower than the
costs of delayed outbreak response, even
without considering the costs of infection-
related deaths and disability [7]. Because
many VBDs are also zoonoses, cuts in
control would also place animal health in
jeopardy. For example, if Rift Valley fever
virus is imported to the US, livestock,
wildlife, and humans will all be affected.
The monetary cuts would lead to irre-
placeable cuts in expertise and human
capital and lead to delayed recognition of
new VBDs. Research in new diagnostics,
prevention, and control efforts would also
be decimated, undoubtedly with major
global repercussions.
Simple Solutions for Complex
Diseases
As new diseases emerge and old diseases
reemerge, we believe that the government
should actually increase the budget for the
DVBID. The old dictum states that an
ounce of prevention is worth a pound of
cure. In no other part of the nation’s
health system is this truer than with regard
to VBDs. No treatments exist for many of
these infections, and vaccines are under
development for only a few VBDs, such as
WNV and dengue. Therefore, surveillance
and vector control remain our only
practical tools for prevention of disease.
Continued development of vaccines for
VBDs should remain a priority. Evidence
suggests that a recent surge in global
yellow fever cases has been due to the
decline in mosquito control and yellow
fever virus vaccination efforts. This fact
highlights the tenuous hold we maintain
over these infections, and draws attention
to the immediate increase in disease
burden that should be expected from any
lack of persistent focus on surveillance and
control [23,24].
Control is the only way to stop these
infections from emerging, and in order to
control these infections, we need to know
where they are circulating. In the past five
years, dengue virus has spread along the
Texas and Florida borders, and is expand-
ing rapidly in Puerto Rico. Meanwhile,
WNV continues to cause severe neurolog-
ical disease across America. Other persis-
tent VBDs, including La Crosse virus in
the Midwest and Eastern equine enceph-
alitis in Florida, Massachusetts, Michigan,
Georgia, and Louisiana, have caused
significant outbreaks this year. Although
the numbers appear small by national
health statistics, they are kept small by the
persistence and focus of the DVBID
surveillance program (Table 1). Substan-
tial economic losses and health care
disruption can result from severe arboviral
outbreaks [7,25]. Any one of these infec-
tions could result in a major, multi-state
outbreak if weather conditions were favor-
able and control wasn’t immediate and
effective. To appropriately address VBDs,
the US requires an energetic infrastructure
for detection, diagnosis, response, and
prevention at the national, state, and local
levels.
We have witnessed the devastation these
infections can inflict on healthy children in
the US and abroad. As the world becomes
increasingly networked through globaliza-
tion, and as climate change continues to
modify vector distribution and abundance
worldwide, infections that were once
Table 1. Cases of Vector-Borne Diseases by Pathogen Group in the US Reported to the CDC [30].
VBD 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008
Viruses 140 393 2,074 12,891 1,272 3,114 4,384 3,748 1,435
Bacteria 18,373 15,530 18,507 21,421 21,654 25,403 22,331 29,809 37,887
Parasites 1,560 1,414 1,199 1,278 1,458 1,494 1,474 1,408 1,255
Total 20,073 17,337 21,780 35,590 24,384 30,011 28,189 34,965 40,577
The virus category includes California serogroup, Eastern equine, Western equine, St. Louis, West Nile, and La Crosse encephalitis and non-neuroinvasive (2003: 9,862;
2005: 1,704; 2006: 2,779; 2008: 679) cases when reported. The bacteria category includes Lyme disease (confirmed and probable), tularemia, Rocky Mountain spotted
fever, and plague cases. The parasite category reflects reported malaria cases.
doi:10.1371/journal.pntd.0000847.t001
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such as Japanese encephalitis and Rift
Valley fever, are likely to spread to new
areas. Just as WNV emerged in the US in
1999, other arboviral pathogens will
escape control to infect large susceptible
populations [12,26–29]. Continuing pub-
lic health surveillance for VBDs and
continuing vector control (outside the
standard health care delivery systems) are
crucial to preventing these diseases and the
morbidity and mortality that they cause.
The benefits of continued (and improved)
surveillance for VBDs are undeniable.
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